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HOW TO DO SURGERY ON THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF LIBEL 
R. George Wright* 
I INTRODUCTION 
Of late, the constitutional law of libel has become the focus of increasing 
dissatisfaction.1 This dissatisfaction has taken various forms.2 The argument 
below, however, is that the most crucial defect of constitutional libel law lies in 
the Court’s continuing attempts to draw and utilize distinctions among public 
figure and private figure libel plaintiffs. The Court should abandon these 
attempts. Instead, the Court should attend, broadly and fundamentally, to the 
constitutionally vital distinction between libelous speech that does or does not 
address some matter of public interest and concern. 
The argument below first emphasizes the constitutional logic underlying the 
Court’s initial imposition of First Amendment limitations on the state tort law 
of libel.3 The argument then critiques the Court’s initial embrace of a supposedly 
fundamental but actually distracting distinction between public and private 
figure libel plaintiffs.4 Interestingly, for a brief time, a divided Court returned to 
a focus on the underlying logic of putting First Amendment limits on the tort of 
libel,5 only to then re-distract itself with a renewed focus on questions of public 
and private figure status.6 Perhaps inevitably though, the Court’s emphasis on 
public versus private figure status has been qualified, in limited ways, by 
recourse to the genuinely basic and more valuable distinction between speech 
 
 *  Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of 
Law. 
 1.  For the most authoritative recent occasion, see the broad-ranging concerns briefly 
expressed by Justice Gorsuch in Berisha v. Lawson, 141 S. Ct. 2424, 2425–30 (2021) (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting from denial of certiorari) (mem.). 
 2.  For a sense of some of the major concerns, see Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Rethinking Libel 
for the Twenty-First Century, 87 TENN. L. REV. 465, 469–78 (2020). 
 3.  See infra Section II.A. 
 4.  See infra Section II.B. 
 5.  See infra Section II.C. 
 6.  See infra Section II.D. 
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that does or does not address some matter of public interest and concern.7 
The argument below then catalogs some additional problems inherent in the 
Court’s public versus private figure libel plaintiff distinction.8 The argument 
then defends the essential priority of a focus on the public interest versus merely 
private interest nature of the subject matter of the libel defendant’s speech.9 A 
brief, but comprehensive, conclusion then follows.10 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT AND MISDIRECTION OF DOCTRINE IN THE 
MAJOR CASES 
A. THE COURT INITIALLY CHOOSES TO FOCUS ON THE STATUS OF PUBLIC 
OFFICIALS 
Debates over First Amendment limitations on the state tort law of libel were 
given momentum in the landmark case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.11 
Famously, the New York Times case held that a public official, however defined, 
may not recover damages arising from “a defamatory falsehood relating to his 
official conduct unless he proves[12] that the statement was made[13] with ‘actual 
malice’—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard[14] 
of whether it was false or not.”15 
Defamatory speech not addressing the libel plaintiff’s official governmental 
conduct will typically be of reduced public interest. Of course, much speech on 
matters of public interest and concern in general will not also address the specific 
conduct of any particular public officials engaged in their official conduct. On 
the other hand, much speech addressing the official conduct of government 
officials, but not all such speech, should qualify as speech on a matter of public 
interest and concern. 
The partial overlap between the category of speech addressing official 
conduct and the category of speech on matters of public interest and concern 
may have contributed to the intriguing fact that the Court’s justification of its 
rule in New York Times focused largely, and quite sensibly, on the latter rather 
than on the former category.16 The logic of the Court’s landmark opinion in New 
York Times actually, and again quite rightly, draws more on the value of 
discussion of public issues in general than on the value of any critique of the 
 
 7.  See infra Section II.E. 
 8.  See infra Part III. 
 9.  See infra Part IV. 
 10.  See infra Part V. 
 11.  376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 12.  A plaintiff must prove by clear and convincing evidence, rather than by a mere 
preponderance of the evidence or else beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 285–86. 
 13.  The Court did not distinguish in this context between the media and nonmedia defendants 
in New York Times. See id. at 286. 
 14.  This reckless disregard of the falsity of one’s defamatory claims is to be judged mainly 
on a subjective, or state of mind, basis. See St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968). 
 15.  New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279–80. 
 16.  See id. at 269–71. 
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conduct of public officials in particular.17 
Thus, the Court’s logic in New York Times focused on “[t]he general 
proposition that freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the 
First Amendment.”18 Freedom of speech and of the press “was fashioned to 
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and 
social changes desired by the people.”19 Political change, let alone the broader 
category of social change, clearly extends far beyond critique of official conduct. 
Even if we focus on political matters, however defined, the express logic of 
New York Times clearly transcends the mere criticism of official behavior. The 
Court thus declares that “the opportunity for free political discussion to the end 
that government may be responsive to the will of the people and that changes 
may be obtained by lawful means . . . is a fundamental principle of our 
constitutional system.”20 
The logic of New York Times thus clearly extends, on its own explicit terms, 
well beyond the presumed value of even inaccurate, “vehement, caustic, and 
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.”21 
The Court’s logic in New York Times specifically embraced our “profound 
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”22 The speech at issue in New York Times 
was rightly categorized as “an expression of grievance and protest on one of the 
major public issues of our time.”23 
The concurring opinion in New York Times of Justices Black and Douglas24 
similarly emphasizes the discussion of “public affairs.”25 And the opinion of 
Justices Goldberg and Douglas rightly declares, broadly, that “[t]he theory of 
our Constitution is that every citizen may speak his mind and every newspaper 
express its view on matters of public concern.”26 
Justices Goldberg and Douglas thus join their colleagues in focusing broadly 
on “public affairs”27 and on “public matters,”28 above and beyond the conduct 
of public officials.29 Justices Goldberg and Douglas refer in particular to Justice 
Douglas’s extrajudicial declaration that a “main function of the First 
Amendment is to ensure ample opportunity for the people to determine and 
resolve public issues. Where public matters are involved, the doubts should be 
resolved in favor of freedom of expression rather than against it.”30 
 
 17.  See id. at 270–71. 
 18.  Id. at 269. 
 19.  Id. (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). 
 20.  Id. (quoting Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931)). 
 21.  Id. at 270. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. at 271. 
 24.  Id. at 293–97 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring). 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. at 298–99 (Goldberg & Douglas, JJ., concurring in result). 
 27.  Id. at 300. 
 28.  Id. at 302. 
 29.  See id. 
 30.  Id. (quoting WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 41 (1958)). 
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Doubtless the Court in New York Times decided the case before it and left a 
number of important issues outside the scope of its holding. The later cases 
addressing those unresolved issues clearly vary in their attention to, and 
consistency with, the explicitly cited foundations of New York Times.31 But the 
logic of attending crucially to speech on matters of public interest and concern, 
rather than to the conduct of either public officials or of public figures outside 
the scope of public interest matters, is explicitly acknowledged in New York 
Times.32 Attention to protecting speech on matters of public interest and concern, 
apart from any distinction between public and private figure libel plaintiffs, is 
clear in the case itself.33 
The Court’s first occasion to elaborate upon the practical meaning of New 
York Times arose in the context of determining who should count or not count 
as a “public official” subject to the actual malice rule of New York Times.34 In 
Rosenblatt v. Baer, the Court acknowledged that it had not determined how far 
down in governmental rank or stature a libel plaintiff must be before the 
requirement to prove actual malice should no longer apply.35 
The Court in Rosenblatt did not attempt to specify with any clarity the 
boundaries of the public official category in the libel context.36 The term was 
thought to encompass “at the very least . . . those among the hierarchy[37] of 
government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial 
responsibility for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs.”38 
Rather than attempt to draw any such a line, the Court in Rosenblatt instead 
recurred to the explicit logic of New York Times and in particular to the 
“profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issue[s] 
should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”39 The Rosenblatt Court thus 
rightly focused on the “strong interest in debate on public issues.”40 
More elaborately, Justice Douglas’s concurring opinion in Rosenblatt41 
sharpened the focus on public issues rather than on public official status.42 
Justice Douglas began with a crucial focus on the value of “free discussion of 
 
 31.  See infra Sections II.B–E. 
 32.  See supra notes 18–30 and accompanying text. 
 33.  And thus need not be treated as merely one possible line of further development. See 
Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of the First 
Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191, 221 (referring to the Court’s possible “invitation to follow 
a dialectic progression from public official to government policy to public policy to matters in the 
public domain,” apart from any ranking or priority among these categories.); see also LEE C. 
BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS 8, 45–46 (1991) (discussing Kalven in this regard). 
 34.  Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 83 (1966). 
 35.  See id. at 85. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  It may be possible though for a government official to have no hierarchical superior, but 
in an insignificant office, and to fall outside the policy logic of requiring government officials to 
show actual malice with respect to criticism of their official performance. 
 38.  Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 85. 
 39.  Id. (emphasis added) (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at 88–94 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 42.  See id. at 89–91. 
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public issues.”43 Pointedly, Justice Douglas observed: 
If the term ‘public official’ were a constitutional term, we would be stuck 
with it and have to give it content. But the term is our own; and so long as 
we are fashioning a rule of free discussion of public issues I cannot relate 
it only to those who, by the Court’s standard, are deemed to hold public 
office.44 
More concisely, Justice Douglas sensibly attended instead to “whether a 
public issue, not a public official, is involved.”45 
Justice Douglas then joined an opinion by Justice Black.46 In a relatively 
narrow formulation, Justice Black declared that “the right to criticize a public 
agent engaged in public activities . . . should not[] depend upon whether . . . that 
agent is arbitrarily labeled a ‘public official.’”47 This, by itself, might suggest 
merely that Justice Black was seeking a broad definition of public official, 
perhaps to encompass all public school teachers, all police officers, and all 
public bureaucrats engaged in public activities. But then, crucially, Justice Black 
explicitly expanded his concern to endorse “[a]n unconditional right to say what 
one pleases about public affairs” as “the minimum guarantee of the First 
Amendment.”48 Once again, the largely superficial attention to questions of 
public official status distracts from a more constitutionally valuable focus on 
discussion of public affairs or public issues, however such matters are to be 
defined. 
B. THE COURT THEN UNFORTUNATELY CHOOSES TO FOCUS ON 
DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FIGURE LIBEL PLAINTIFFS 
A much more severe and pervasive misvaluation and sheer distraction was 
then introduced into the constitutional law of libel by the case of Curtis 
Publishing Co. v. Butts.49 This case extended the New York Times actual malice 
rule and other rules regarding public official libel plaintiffs to cases brought by 
what the Court referred to as “public figures.”50 In addition to the New York 
Times requirements, the Court required public figures who are not also public 
officials to make a showing of the libel defendant’s “highly unreasonable 
conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation 
and reporting . . . adhered to by responsible publishers.”51 
The Curtis Publishing case could hardly be expected to address, let alone 
 
 43.  Id. at 89. 
 44.  Id. at 90. 
 45.  Id. at 91. For discussion of Justice Douglas’s opinion on this point, see THOMAS I. 
EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 526 (1970). 
 46.  Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 94–100 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring and dissenting). 
 47.  Id. at 95. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  388 U.S. 130 (1967). 
 50.  See id. at 155. 
 51.  Id. This requirement presumes a focus on an institutional press and on recognized 
minimum standards of professional journalism practice that is increasingly irrelevant to today’s 
emerging social media environment.  
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resolve, the various constitutional questions raised by any distinction between 
public figure and private figure libel plaintiffs. But the opinion did highlight that 
the libel plaintiffs “commanded a substantial amount of independent public 
interest at the time of the publications.”52 This formulation, by itself, seems to 
suggest a possible difference between what we might call preestablished public 
figures and persons who might become a public figure, of one sort or another, 
only after or as a result of the defamatory publication and the public reaction 
thereto. 
The Court in Curtis Publishing then pointed to a possible distinction in what 
we might call the source of, or path to, public figure status. Some nonpublic 
officials may be public figures as a result of their sufficiently prominent 
organizational leadership position.53 Other persons, perhaps without such 
organizational status, may have “purposeful[ly]” thrust themselves sufficiently 
into the “vortex” of a sufficiently “important public controversy” to qualify as a 
public figure.54 
Thus, the Curtis Publishing Court’s initial foray into the constitutional 
relevance of public figure status actually made the idea of a public issue or 
controversy into a necessary element of at least some forms of public figure 
status.55 To this extent, the Court’s understanding of the public figure versus 
private figure distinction ironically, and quite revealingly, requires and depends 
upon incorporating into libel law the idea of a public controversy over some 
issue.56 
On the Court’s view, public figure status is linked, whether by definition or 
as a practical matter, to some sufficient opportunity to meaningfully respond to 
the defamatory statements at issue.57 The famous libel plaintiffs in Curtis 
Publishing “commanded sufficient continuing public interest and had sufficient 
access to the means of counterargument to be able ‘to expose through discussion 
the falsehood and fallacies’ of the defamatory statements.”58 
There is, unfortunately, a difference between the realistic ability to command 
public attention in seeking to refute a defamatory statement, and the unlikely 
prospect of the truth actually catching up with the lie, in the sense of even 
reaching all persons who have somehow been made aware of the defamatory 
claim.59 So the law must somehow account for the inescapable gap between an 
opportunity for a publicized rebuttal and a full recovery of one’s reputation. 
Even apart from building some version of a concern for public issues into its 
 
 52.  Id. at 154 
 53.  See id. at 154–55. 
 54.  Id. at 155. 
 55.  See id. at 154–55. 
 56.  See id. at 155. 
 57.  See id. 
 58.  Id. (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)). 
 59.  Hence the unfortunate result that the truth and the victim’s reputation are rarely fully 
reestablished on a lasting basis. For a sense of the popular-folk appreciation of this point, see A Lie 
Can Travel Halfway Around the World While the Truth Is Putting on Its Shoes, QUOTE 
INVESTIGATOR, http://quoteinvestigator.com/2014/07/13/truth [https://perma.cc/R5A7-KTBV] 
(Nov. 6, 2017). 
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theory of public figure status, the Court in Curtis Publishing continued to 
explicitly rely on the explanatory and guiding importance of free discussion of 
public matters.60 The Court rightly specified, in particular, that freedom of 
speech and of the press is designed and intended to prevent “any action of the 
government by means of which it might prevent such free and general discussion 
of public matters as seems absolutely essential.”61 
C. THE COURT THEN TEMPORARILY FOCUSES ON WHAT CONSTITUTIONALLY 
MATTERS MOST 
The logic of the Court’s own basic assumptions was, unfortunately only 
briefly, brought to the forefront in the case of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.62 
In Rosenbloom, a temporarily ascendant Court plurality, led by Justice Brennan, 
managed to rightly prioritize the nature or subject of the defamatory speech 
rather than the public figure or other status of the libel plaintiff.63 On Justice 
Brennan’s view, “[f]reedom of discussion . . . must embrace all issues about 
which information is needed or appropriate to enable the members of society to 
cope with the exigencies of their period.”64 
Justice Brennan then declined to take a narrowly governmental, or expressly 
political, view of the subjects of public interest and concern.65 Such subjects 
should include, as well, “myriad matters of public interest”66 that encompass 
“truth, science, morality, and arts in general.”67 And then, crucially, Justice 
Brennan inferred that the question of whether the libel plaintiff should count as 
a private figure should not take precedence over the need for responsible 
discussion of public issues, broadly conceived.68 
The logic of this vital recognition led Justice Brennan to then declare the 
crucial question to be “whether the utterance involved concerns an issue of 
public or general concern.”69 Given especially that “some aspects of the lives of 
even the most public [persons] fall outside the area of matters of public or 
general concern,”70 a distinction between public and private figure libel 
plaintiffs is useful, at most, in shedding light on whether the speech at issue 
addresses a matter of public interest or not. Actually, Justice Brennan himself 
arguably goes even further in declaring that “[d]rawing a distinction between 
‘public’ and ‘private’ figures makes no sense in terms of the First Amendment 
 
 60.  Curtis Publ’g Co., 388 U.S. at 147, 149–50. 
 61.  Id. at 150 (citation omitted). 
 62.  403 U.S. 29 (1971) (plurality opinion). 
 63.  See id. at 43–44. 
 64.  Id. at 41 (quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)). 
 65.  See id. at 42. 
 66.  Id. 
 67.  Id. (quoting Curtis Publ’g Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 147 (1967)). 
 68.  See id. at 43–44. For an exceptionally thoughtful similar emphasis at the state level, see 
Journal-Gazette Co. v. Bandido’s, Inc., 712 N.E.2d 446, 452 (Ind. 1999). See also Pack v. Mast, 
No. 3:19-CV-501, 2021 WL 411153, at *6 n.2 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 5, 2021). 
 69.  Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 44. 
 70.  Id. at 48. 
COPYRIGHT © 2021 SMU LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 
152 SMU LAW REVIEW FORUM [Vol. 74:145 
guarantees.”71 
Justice Black’s opinion in Rosenbloom correspondingly declared that “First 
Amendment protection extends to all discussion and communication involving 
matters of public or general concern, without regard to whether the persons 
involved are famous or anonymous.”72 This entirely reasonable approach, 
however, was destined for sharp limitation, at least as a general matter. 
D. THE COURT THEN RE-DISTRACTS ITSELF BY CHOOSING TO FOCUS ON 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FIGURE LIBEL PLAINTIFF STATUS 
The Court unfortunately backtracked substantially from the Rosenbloom 
plurality view in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.73 In Gertz, Justice Powell appeared 
to assume, unnecessarily, that a rule focusing on the presence of a matter of 
public interest and concern would inevitably require something like realistic, or 
practical, near-immunity from libel judgments whenever the speech addressed 
such a matter.74 
There is, however, no reason to assume that speech on a public matter must 
be protected by any particular test. Focusing on the public interest subject matter 
of the speech does not logically require anything like nearly absolute protection, 
any version of an actual malice standard, a showing of recklessness, or even of 
gross negligence. Nor does an emphasis on subject matter require proof of any 
state of mind of the libel defendant by, say, clear and convincing evidence, or 
for that matter, by a beyond a reasonable doubt standard or a substantial 
preponderance of the evidence standard. All of these matters should be resolved 
after attending not only to the value of speech on matters of public interest and 
concern but also to the relevant reputational and procedural interests as well. 
In any event, Justice Powell in Gertz noted the inevitable conflicts between 
“the need for a vigorous and uninhibited press and the legitimate interest in 
redressing wrongful injury.”75 Gertz then held that the New York Times actual 
malice rule should be limited in certain damages contexts in accordance with a 
distinction between public figure and private figure libel plaintiffs.76 
The logic of Gertz in this respect is that, in general, public officials and public 
figures tend to have more effective self-help remedies against libel than do 
private figures.77 Private figure libel victims tend to have less effective media 
access in seeking to rebut false and defamatory claims.78 The theory is that 
private figures therefore tend to be more vulnerable to defamatory injuries that 
they cannot themselves redress.79 
 
 71.  Id. at 45–46. 
 72.  Id. at 57 (Black, J., concurring in judgment) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 73.  418 U.S. 323 (1974). 
 74.  See id. at 346. 
 75.  Id. at 342. 
 76.  See id. at 343. 
 77.  Id. at 344. 
 78.  See id. 
 79.  Id. 
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As well, the Gertz Court endorsed the theory that most public figures have 
voluntarily chosen to assume the risk of not only rough-and-tumble critique in 
general but also of negligent, and even reckless, defamatory abuse.80 Justice 
Powell specifically rejected the alternative of focusing on whether the speech at 
issue addressed a matter of public interest.81 Such a focus was mistakenly 
thought by Justice Powell to undervalue the reputational interests of private 
figure libel plaintiffs.82 And Justice Powell also assumed that the courts should 
not be entrusted with the task of distinguishing between speech that is or is not 
on a matter of public interest and concern,83 a conclusion that Justice Powell 
himself would later largely abandon.84 
Of course, Justice Powell’s approach unavoidably requires judicial 
determinations, in general and in particular cases, of who should be counted as 
a public figure. Even in Gertz itself, Justice Powell recognizes the possible 
further distinction between general-purpose public figures and limited-purpose 
public figures.85 And then there would be the need to distinguish between 
voluntary and involuntary public figures.86 Inescapably, the latter distinction 
would, at best, be a matter of degree. 
What Justice Powell in Gertz could hardly have imagined, of course, would 
be the novel questions of public figure versus private figure status in our own 
era of dominant, but fragmented, social media, including viral outbursts that are 
both transient and permanently accessible.87 
But even as of the time of Gertz, Justice Powell could have better separated 
the inquiry into the public or private interest status of the defamatory speech, 
and the degree to which such speech should be constitutionally protected. An 
emphasis on the importance of speech on matters of public interest, again, does 
not by itself imply that such speech should be protected by any particular 
standard, let alone by an actual malice standard.88 Nor does a determination that 
speech is not on a matter of public interest somehow require, or necessarily 
permit, imposing strict liability on even a careful libel defendant.89 
After Gertz, the Supreme Court as well as the lower courts have sought to 
work through some of the complications resulting from Gertz’s misguided 
priorities. Merely for example, the Court in Time, Inc. v. Firestone90 determined 
that the nationally publicized divorce of one of the nation’s wealthiest couples, 
though a “cause celebre,” did not involve a public figure libel plaintiff.91 The 
 
 80.  See id. at 344–45. 
 81.  Id. at 346. 
 82.  See id. Again, though, a focus on the nature of the libel defendant’s speech does not by 
itself dictate any particular weight for any reputational interests at stake. 
 83.  Id. 
 84.  See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758–59 (1985) 
(plurality opinion). 
 85.  See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345. 
 86.  See id. 
 87.  See infra notes 135–156 and accompanying text. 
 88.  But see Gertz, 418 U.S. at 346 (assuming, without any explanation, the contrary). 
 89.  But see id. (assuming, without any explanation, the contrary). 
 90.  424 U.S. 448 (1976). 
 91.  See id. at 454–55. 
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real problem was that, pursuant to Gertz, the Court in Firestone was required to 
hold that while this divorce fell within the category of “controversies of interest 
to the public,” it somehow did not also fall within the category of a “public 
controversy” for purposes of determining public or private figure status.92 The 
Court’s vain and unnecessary attempt to distinguish between “controversies of 
interest to the public” and “public controversies” relies significantly upon, while 
making more unmanageable, the Rosenbloom distinction that Gertz nominally 
sought to set aside.93 
Soon thereafter, the Court determined that the libel plaintiff’s status as either 
a public figure or a private figure should refer to the plaintiff’s status before the 
time of the alleged defamation.94 This principle reflects the judgment that a libel 
defendant should not be permitted to convert a private figure into a public figure, 
thereby invoking an actual malice requirement, by engendering a widespread 
interest in the libel plaintiff through fanning the flames of the controversy.95 
Thus, the defendant’s publicizing a controversy for which that defendant was 
responsible should not affect the relevant libel rules to the plaintiff’s detriment. 
Initially, it may seem reasonable to fix the libel plaintiff’s status at the point 
before the defamation in question. But matters are, it turns out, actually more 
complicated. Not all of the postdefamation controversy and media controversy 
will necessarily have been engineered for manipulative purposes by the libel 
defendant. Imagine a firestorm of postdefamation media opportunities for the 
libel plaintiff along with numerous requests for national-level interviews across 
various media. Of course, none of this need be voluntarily sought out by the libel 
plaintiff. But on the logic of Gertz and the ensuing cases, why isn’t the plaintiff’s 
substantial and appropriately focused media access and attention relevant to 
public figure status? By assumption, the plaintiff can now address any 
defamatory statement with detailed, continuing, and broad media attention. The 
plaintiff’s side of the story can now be fully aired, perhaps to an extent not 
available to many previously established public figures or public officials. Why 
shouldn’t that matter? Why should the fact that the plaintiff could not have 
commanded media access before the defamation96 be more relevant, and indeed 
decisive?97 
Equally important is the unavoidably underdeveloped distinction between 
sufficiently and insufficiently voluntary actions by the eventual libel plaintiff. 
Voluntary and involuntary exposure to controversy do not come clearly labeled 
as such. The problem of making such determinations for purposes of the public 
 
 92.  Id. at 454. 
 93.  See supra notes 53–54 and accompanying text. 
 94.  See Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 134–35 (1979). 
 95.  See id.  
 96.  See id. 
 97.  Note in particular Gertz’s focus on the plaintiff’s ability, at relevant times, to command 
significant media access and attention so as to meaningfully address and respond to the defamatory 
statements. See supra notes 77–78 and accompanying text; see also William P. Robinson III, 
Rachel M. Feit & Katherine M. King, The Tie Goes to the Runner: The Need for Clearer and More 
Precise Criteria Regarding the Public Figure in Defamation Law, 42 U. HAW. L. REV. 72, 106–09 
(2019) (discussing the standard emphasis on determining public or private figure status based on 
the libel plaintiff’s voluntary activities before the libelous statements). 
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versus private figure distinction was helpfully illustrated in Wolston v. Reader’s 
Digest Ass’n.98 
In Wolston, the Court rejected the lower court’s conclusion that the libel 
plaintiff Wolston amounted to a limited-purpose public figure.99 The context 
involved official investigation into alleged Soviet espionage in the 1940s and 
1950s.100 Wolston decided to refuse to appear before a grand jury investigating 
such matters, thereby subjecting himself to a contempt citation.101 The district 
court accordingly found that by such voluntary refusal to testify, Wolston 
“became involved in a controversy of a decidedly public nature in a way that 
invited attention and comment, and thereby created in the public an interest in 
knowing about his connection with espionage.”102 
The Supreme Court, however, rejected the idea that Wolston’s involvement 
in an assumedly important public controversy qualified as “voluntary.”103 The 
Court instead concluded that while Wolston “voluntarily chose not to appear 
before the grand jury, knowing that his action might be attended by publicity,” 
this choice was “not decisive on the question of public-figure status.”104 While 
Wolston had chosen to defend himself against the contempt charge, he had never 
discussed the matter with the press.105 A private figure “is not automatically 
transformed into a public figure just by becoming involved in or associated with 
a [newsworthy] matter that attracts public attention.”106 
Reasonable minds could differ, certainly, as to whether Wolston’s 
involvement in public controversy should be characterized as mostly, or entirely, 
voluntary or involuntary.107 But that is hardly the point. Plainly, Wolston’s acts 
were not involuntary in the sense of being like a reflexive muscle twitch or 
having his arm moved by some external force.108 In this sense, any genuine act 
by Wolston would inevitably be voluntary. As used by the Court in determining 
public or private figure status, voluntary should instead be interpreted as 
something like “sufficiently free or unconstrained” for purposes of the public 
versus private figure distinction. 
A person may freely, deliberately, and responsibly enter into an area of 
controversy, and yet be predictably or unpredictably then “swept up” or “caught 
up” by the perhaps uncontrollable emerging course of that controversy. And the 
 
 98.  443 U.S. 157 (1979). 
 99.  Id. at 166. 
 100.  Id. at 165. 
 101.  Id. 
 102.  Id. (quoting Wolston v. Reader’s Dig. Ass’n, 429 F. Supp. 167, 178 n.33 (D.D.C. 1977), 
aff’d, 578 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1978), rev’d, 443 U.S. 157 (1979)). 
 103.  See id. at 166. 
 104.  Id. at 167. 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. A contrary approach, the Court indicated, would in effect restore the plurality’s focus 
on matters of public interest in Rosenbloom. Id. (citing Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 
29, 44 (1971)). 
 107.  See Frederick Adrian Siegler, Voluntary and Involuntary, 52 MONIST 268, 268–69 (1968) 
(discussing distinct types of involuntariness and voluntariness); Bernard Williams, Voluntary Acts 
and Responsible Agents, 10 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 1–4 (1990) (providing similar information). 
 108.  See Williams, supra note 107, at 1, 4; Siegler, supra note 107, at 271. 
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person’s initial entry into that arena may itself reflect varying degrees of 
freedom, deliberation, and responsibility.109 
It is admittedly possible for someone to be initially swept up or caught up in 
a controversy in roughly the way a person sleeping in a mountainside location 
might be swept up or caught up in an unpredictable avalanche. But that person’s 
subsequent acts to escape the avalanche would then normally be thought of as 
voluntary. Yet for many purposes, the person’s attempts to respond to the 
avalanche might actually reflect widely varying degrees of freedom, 
deliberation, and responsibility, depending upon the circumstances and upon our 
reasons for asking about degrees of freedom and constraint.110 
In typical cases, the voluntary actions of the libel plaintiff can be 
characterized as free, deliberate, and responsible in some respects but not others. 
This distinction is thus, inescapably, deeply complex and contestable. It is 
certainly possible that a decision to refuse to testify before a grand jury could be 
deemed free, deliberate, and responsible despite the high stakes.111 But it is 
equally possible to conclude that a person who thus refused to testify was 
uncontrollably swept up by events and circumstances, such that the choice to not 
testify was insufficiently free, deliberate, and responsible for public figure status 
to attach.112 There simply are no authoritative answers in such cases. 
The courts thus plainly lack any principled guidance as to how to determine 
whether the person’s generally voluntary actions were sufficiently free, 
deliberate, and responsible for public figure status. Nor is this at all likely to 
change any time soon. The relevant senses of freedom and constraint may well 
already bear controversial normative judgments within them113 and, in any 
event, are generally indeterminate in legal contexts.114 To the extent that the 
public versus private figure distinction depends, as it crucially does, on a 
reasonably clear and defensible understanding of “voluntariness,” it must always 
and inherently be deeply problematic. 
E. THE UNDERLYING LOGIC OF FREE SPEECH AND REPUTATION 
UNDERSTANDABLY BEGINS TO REASSERT ITSELF IN LIMITED CONTEXTS 
Perhaps not surprisingly, judicial interest in whether the defamatory speech 
addresses a matter of public interest and concern enjoyed a very limited 
resurgence in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.115 Dun & 
 
 109.  See Siegler, supra note 107, at 268, 271; Williams, supra note 107, at 8–9. Thus, problems 
result from any attempt to emphasize the concept of voluntariness in distinguishing public and 
private figures. See, e.g., David A. Logan, Rescuing Our Democracy by Rethinking New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 81 OHIO ST. L.J. 759, 785, 812 (2020). 
 110.  See Siegler, supra note 107, at 272–73. 
 111.  See supra note 104 and accompanying text. Sometimes, our freest and most authentic 
moral acts involve situations in which we feel that we had “no real choice” but to act as we did. 
 112.  See supra note 104 and accompanying text. 
 113.  See R. George Wright, Why a Coercion Test is of No Use in Establishment Clause Cases, 
41 CUMB. L. REV. 193, 202 (2010). 
 114.  See id. at 224. 
 115.  472 U.S. 749 (1985). 
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Bradstreet involved what was held to be a private figure libel plaintiff.116 For a 
three-Justice plurality, Justice Powell set aside his own earlier view in Gertz that 
the courts should not attempt to distinguish matters of public concern from 
matters of merely private concern.117 Justice Powell’s opinion instead held that 
private figure libel plaintiffs may receive even “presumed and punitive 
damages . . . [without] a showing of ‘actual malice’ . . . when the defamatory 
statements do not involve matters of public concern.”118 
Justice Powell thus validated a judicial concern for matters of public versus 
private interest, at least in the limited context of Dun & Bradstreet. The problem, 
though, is that his underlying logic in attending to that distinction clearly carries 
beyond anything like the circumstances of Dun & Bradstreet. By Justice 
Powell’s own logic, a focus on public interest, as distinct from private interest 
speech, should be fundamental to the constitutional law of libel. 
Thus, Justice Powell resoundingly declared in Dun & Bradstreet that “[t]he 
First Amendment ‘was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for 
the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.’”119 The 
Court must ensure that “debate on public issues [will] be uninhibited, robust, 
and wide-open.”120 More specifically, “not all speech is of equal First 
Amendment importance.”121 Crucially, “[i]t is speech on ‘matters of public 
concern’ that is ‘at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection.’”122 Justice 
Powell then declared that “speech on matters of purely private concern is of less 
First Amendment concern.”123 
In light of this need to distinguish between speech that is or is not on a matter 
of public concern, at least in some contexts, there is then an obvious need for 
judicial guidance as to how to draw the distinction in question. And in this 
regard, Justice Powell draws upon the more frequently litigated context of 
speech-based discipline of public employees.124 The gist of the limited guidance 
Justice Powell offers is merely that “[w]hether . . . speech addresses a matter of 
public concern must be determined by [the expression’s] content, form, and 
context . . . as revealed by the whole record.”125 
 
 116.  See id. at 753. 
 117.  See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974). 
 118.  Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 763. Why such libel plaintiffs must still show at least 
negligent disregard for falsity is left undiscussed by the plurality. See id. at 751–63. 
 119.  Id. at 759 (quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). 
 120.  Id. at 762 (quoting N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964)). 
 121.  Id. at 758. 
 122.  Id. at 758–59 (some internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Bos. 
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978)). 
 123.  Id. at 759 (citation omitted). Justice Powell leaves unclear why libelous speech, or indeed 
any other kind of speech, that does not address any matter of any public interest or concern should 
receive any distinctive free speech protection at all. See R. George Wright, Cyber Harassment and 
the Scope of Freedom of Speech, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. ONLINE 187, 207–08, 208 nn.153–54 
(2020) (discussing case split on this issue). While it makes more sense to deny any distinctive free 
speech protection to speech that does not implicate any reasons for protecting speech, we can, for 
present purposes, accept either approach. See id. 
 124.  See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 472 U.S. at 761 (relying on Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 
147–48 (1983)). 
 125.  Id. (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48). Whether the idea of speech on a matter of 
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Since Dun & Bradstreet, the Court has acknowledged the usefulness of 
inquiring into the public versus private interest character of the speech at issue 
in other specific libel contexts. Thus, even a private figure libel plaintiff bears 
the burden of showing the falsity of the allegedly defamatory statements where 
a newspaper defendant, and presumably other defendants, addresses a matter of 
public concern.126 Here, once again, the Court finds that it must, in some limited 
contexts, incorporate a distinction between speech on public versus private 
matters into its jurisprudence of public and private figure libel plaintiffs. 
The Court has also incorporated explicit attention to the public versus private 
interest distinction in a further, less frequently litigated context. The case of 
Bartnicki v. Vopper127 involved the broadcast of a cell phone conversation that 
had been illegally taped by an unknown person and then forwarded to media 
defendants.128 In such a case, the Court held that the obvious privacy interests at 
stake129 must be weighed against the core First Amendment value of 
appropriately encouraging “the publication of truthful information of public 
concern.”130 The Court here neatly cited the classic 1890 Warren and Brandeis 
law review article for the principle that “[t]he right of privacy does not prohibit 
any publication of matter which is of public or general interest.”131 
III. ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS WITH ATTEMPTS TO DISTINGUISH 
BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE FIGURE LIBEL PLAINTIFFS 
The Supreme Court cases that have focused on and attempted to apply 
distinctions between the categories of public and private figure libel plaintiffs 
have provided only limited judicial guidance.132 The distinction, even at the most 
basic level, was “problematic and hotly contested” as of 1984.133 It is fair to say 
that the rise of a pervasive, highly fragmented, and largely unprofessionally 
curated social media landscape has only multiplied the difficulties of making 
 
public interest should be defined differently in the libel context, as distinct from the public-
employee-discipline context, is left undiscussed. See id. In any event, it is largely true that the 
overall majority in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. “provided almost no guidance as to what constitutes a 
protected ‘matter of public concern.’” Id. at 786 (Brennan, J., with Marshall, Blackmun & Stevens, 
JJ., dissenting); see also City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83 (2004) (per curiam) (“[T]he 
boundaries of the public concern test are not well defined . . . .”). 
 126.  See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 768–69 (1986). 
 127.  532 U.S. 514 (2001). 
 128.  Id. at 517. 
 129.  See id. at 532–33. 
 130.  Id. at 534. 
 131.  Id. (quoting Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193, 214 (1890)). 
 132.  See, e.g., Erik Walker, Comment, Defamation Law: Public Figures—Who Are They?, 45 
BAYLOR L. REV. 955, 955 (1993) (“Lower courts have found little guidance in the few United 
States Supreme Court decisions relating to a plaintiff’s public or private figure status.”); see also 
Ashley Messenger & Kevin Delaney, In the Future, Will We All Be Limited-Purpose Public 
Figures?, 30 COMMC’NS LAW. 4, 4 (2014); Delery H. Perret, An Unforeseen Problem: How Gertz 
Failed to Account for Modern Media and What to Do Now, 80 LA. L. REV. 541, 558 (2020); Amy 
Kristin Sanders & Holly Miller, Revitalizing Rosenbloom:The Matter of Public Concern Standard 
in the Age of the Internet, 12 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 529, 532, 542 (2014). 
 133.  Frederick Schauer, Public Figures, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 905, 906 (1984). 
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even the most basic of such distinctions.134 
Merely for example, consider whether the libel plaintiff “Dr. Luke” should be 
considered either a general-purpose or a limited-purpose public figure in the 
context of a rape allegation brought by a well-known person.135 Dr. Luke “is an 
acclaimed music producer and well known in the entertainment industry.”136 He 
“has appeared in articles in mainstream media for his contributions to pop music, 
his discovery and development of talent, his rise in the music industry and his 
talent as both a businessman and music producer.”137 
Dr. Luke might, on this basis, seem readily classifiable as some sort of public 
figure. But the appellate court majority determined that, despite his high-profile 
career within a major segment of popular entertainment, Dr. Luke “is not a 
household name”138 and thus not a general-purpose public figure without 
more.139 A dissenting opinion, however, adopted an importantly different 
standard.140 On that dissenting standard, Dr. Luke “is a household name to those 
that matter.”141 
There is certainly some logic to discounting the significance of persons who 
have never heard of the libel plaintiff, the libel defendant, or any matter in 
controversy. But this oddly judgmental dissenting approach could, in focusing 
on “those who matter,” logically convert almost anyone, counterintuitively, into 
a general-purpose public figure.142 
Part of the problem here is that the Court’s attempt to distinguish between 
 
 134.  For the most recent authoritative challenge to the status of the public figure versus private 
figure distinction, see Berisha v. Lawson, 141 S. Ct. 2424, 2425 (2021) (Thomas, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari) (mem.) (“[S]urely this Court should not remove a woman’s right to defend 
her reputation in court simply because she accuses a powerful man of rape.”). See also Cass R. 
Sunstein, Clarence Thomas Has a Point About Free-Speech Law, TWINCITIES.COM (Feb. 25, 2019, 
12:11 AM), https://www.twincities.com/2019/02/25/cass-sunstein-clarence-thomas-has-a-point-
about-free-speech-law/ [https://perma.cc/FLS7-BMZD]; Cristina Carmody Tilley, 
(Re)Categorizing Defamation, 94 TUL. L. REV. 435, 488, 508 (2020); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, 
Rethinking Libel for the Twenty-First Century, 87 TENN. L. REV. 465, 477–80 (2020) (discussing 
the proposals of Justice Thomas and Professor Sunstein). 
 135.  See Gottwald v. Sebert, 148 N.Y.S.3d 37, 42–43 (1st Dep’t 2021). 
 136.  Id. at 43. 
 137.  Id. at 45. 
 138.  Id. at 43. 
 139.  Id. Note also the recent observation of Justice Gorsuch: 
[P]rivate citizens can become “public figures” on social media overnight. 
Individuals can be deemed “famous” because of their notoriety in certain channels 
of our now-highly segmented media even as they remain unknown in most.  
. . . . 
Rules intended to ensure a robust debate over actions taken by high public officials 
. . . increasingly seem to leave even ordinary Americans without recourse for 
grievous defamation. 
Berisha, 141 S. Ct. at 2429 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (mem.). 
 140.  See Gottwald, 148 N.Y.S.3d at 48 (Scarpulla, J., dissenting in part). 
 141.  Id. at 49 (emphasis added). 
 142.  The dissenting opinion notes that “Dr. Luke has actively sought out publicity,” at least 
with regard to his professional status in general. Id. But this, on the dissenting opinion’s own logic, 
might amount only to expanding the pool of those media consumers who are deemed to “matter.” 
See id. 
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general- purpose public figures and private figure libel plaintiffs arose in a much 
more homogeneous, less diverse, and less fragmented media landscape than 
exists today. Consider, in the extreme, that a 1983 episode of the network 
television series M*A*S*H attracted 105.9 million viewers;143 a 1980 episode of 
Dallas had 83 million viewers;144 and the 1993 finale of Cheers drew 80.4 
million viewers,145 with total populations lower than today. By contrast, the most 
popular non-sports network television series programing for 2020–2021 
averaged less than 13 million viewers.146 By any measure, a popular media 
celebrity is plainly qualitatively and quantitatively different than it was in, say, 
1974, when Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. was decided.147 
But the contestability of Dr. Luke’s status extends even to whether he should 
count as a limited-purpose public figure. Dr. Luke quite clearly, and quite 
successfully, “actively sought out publicity”148 in connection with his 
professional role. However, it is unclear whether this should matter for limited 
public figure libel plaintiff status. After all, Dr. Luke had not, as the majority 
determined, also “injected himself into the debate about sexual assault or abuse 
of artists in the entertainment industry, which is the subject of the 
defamation.”149 
This further debate illustrates the problem that the scope of the vortex into 
which a party has more or less voluntarily thrust him- or herself, for limited 
public figure status, is not self-defining. If one successfully seeks attention, at 
least in certain circles, as an athlete in a particular sport, then has one thereby 
 
 143.  Stacy Conradt, The Ten Most-Watched TV Series Finales Ever, MENTAL FLOSS (Feb. 28, 
2010), www.mentalfloss.com/article/24673/10-most-watched-series-finales-ever 
[https://perma.cc/TQ88-BAU9]. 
 144.  Millions Tune in to Find Out Who Shot J.R., HIST., www.history.com/this-day-in-
history/millions-tune-in-to-find-out-who-shot-j-r [https://perma.cc/DX53-VHKF] (Nov. 19, 2020). 
The 83 million viewers amounted, remarkably, to 76% of the nation’s televisions sets. See id. 
 145.  Conradt, supra note 143. 
 146.  See Michael Schneider, 100 Most-Watched TV Shows of 2020–21: Winners and Losers, 
VARIETY (May 25, 2021, 2:08 PM), https://variety.com/2021/tv/news/most-popular-tv-shows-
highest-rated-2020-2021-season-1234980743/ [https://perma.cc/9N6R-BHPH]. We hereby set 
aside the complications of best measuring audiences across various platforms and time of viewing 
practices. See id. 
 147.  In 1974, the year in which Gertz was decided, the network television programs All in the 
Family, Sanford and Son, Chico and the Man, and The Jeffersons collectively averaged 
approximately 20 million viewers per episode, which would at least approach something like a 
collectively shared familiarity or cultural frame of reference. See TV Ratings: 1974–1975, CLASSIC 
TV HITS, http://www.classictvhits.com/tvratings/1974.htm [https://perma.cc/KD3K-KDZ5]. Note 
also that at the time of the alleged defamation of Carol Burnett by the National Enquirer, Burnett’s 
network television show had been running for nine consecutive years. See Kara Kovalchik, 16 Fun 
Facts About The Carol Burnett Show, MENTAL FLOSS (Apr. 16, 2018), 
https://www.mentalfloss.com/article/73448/16-ear-tugging-facts-about-carol-burnett-show 
[https://perma.cc/F4R8-Z728] (noting that Burnett’s show began in 1967); Robert Lindsey, Carol 
Burnett and Enquirer Clash in Court, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 1981), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1981/03/18/us/carol-burnett-and-enquirer-clash-in-court.html 
[https://perma.cc/DQ6Q-592H] (noting that alleged defamation occurred in 1976); see also Burnett 
v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 193 Cal. Rptr. 206, 216 (Ct. App. 1983) (highlighting the lower court’s 
assumption of Carol Burnett’s public figure status). 
 148. Gottwald v. Sebert, 148 N.Y.S.3d 37, 49 (1st Dep’t 2021) (Scarpulla, J., dissenting in 
part).  
 149.  Id. at 45 (majority opinion). 
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become a limited-purpose public figure with respect to any or all of the 
preexisting major controversies clearly associated with that sport?150 
Let us simply pose the following hypothetical scenario: Suppose Person A 
accuses Person B of sexually assaulting her. Now, crucially, let us set aside any 
question as to whether the accusation and related discussion addresses a matter 
of public interest and concern. On this basis, we must then ask why the outcome 
of Person B’s libel suit against Person A should crucially depend on whether 
Person B is, in any relevant sense, voluntarily or involuntarily well-known and 
thus a public figure of any sort. If genuinely crucial questions of the presence or 
absence of speech on matters of public interest and concern are set aside, why 
should the law, in this sense, be a respecter of persons?151 Why should Person 
B’s fame, or lack thereof, matter in itself? 
More generally, celebrity-libel-plaintiff law suffers to the extent that concern 
for matters of public interest is backgrounded or ignored. As the libel expert 
Professor Rodney Smolla has observed, “[t]he sex life of a rock star may appeal 
to our prurient curiosity,”152 but unless some public issue is thereby implicated, 
it is hardly clear why traditional libel law principles should be upended in such 
a case. 
Consider, then, a defamatory statement regarding a person we shall assume 
to be a general-purpose public figure. As of a recent survey, the personal Twitter 
accounts of noted pop stars Justin Bieber, Katy Perry, Rihanna, Taylor Swift, 
Ariana Grande, and Lady Gaga were each followed by at least 80 million 
persons.153 Imagine any of these public figures being falsely accused of, say, 
drunken behavior at a restaurant.154 Each such public figure would have to show 
not merely negligence or objective recklessness in publishing the libel but actual 
malice by clear and convincing evidence.155 
Now, it well might be that each of the above general-purpose public figures 
would indeed have a broader and more easily reached audience for their response 
than the accuser would have had for the initial accusation. What is doubtful, 
though, is the legal relevance of that fact and of their public figure status. 
After all, on the assumptions built into this hypothetical, the celebrity victim’s 
response to the libel likely brings the accusation itself to the attention of more 
 
 150.  More narrowly, consider the determination that a libel plaintiff became a limited-purpose 
public figure, thus assuming the risk of false claims, by injecting himself into a public controversy 
merely by “boasting about his jet ski modifications and speeds” on a narrowly focused website. 
Hibdon v. Grabowski, 195 S.W.3d 48, 62 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). 
 151.  See Walter Carrington, Equality Before the Law, 8 VA. L. REG. 481, 481 (1922) (“[T]he 
law is no respecter of persons” is presumed to embody an “absolute and indisputable truth[].”); see 
also McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675, 680 (2019) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) 
(“There are sound reasons to question whether either the First or Fourteenth Amendment, as 
originally understood, encompasses an actual-malice standard for public figures or otherwise 
displaces vast swaths of state defamation law.”). 
 152.  Rodney A. Smolla, Core Doctrine Likely to Hold, 22 COMMC’NS LAW. 11, 22 (2004). 
 153.  See List of Most-Followed Twitter Accounts, WIKIPEDIA, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=List_of_most-followed_Twitter_accounts 
[https://perma.cc/3AAW-H9PP] (Sept. 25, 2021, 7:30 PM). 
 154.  See Burnett v. Nat’l Enquirer, Inc., 193 Cal. Rptr. 206, 208 (Ct. App. 1983). 
 155.  See id. at 216. 
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persons than the accuser was able to reach. More fundamentally, though, it is far 
from clear how designating the libel plaintiff as a public figure, and on that basis 
applying an actual malice requirement, distinctively serves the basic purposes 
and values underlying freedom of speech,156 let alone any reputational concerns. 
Also, the public versus private figure libel plaintiff distinction is particularly 
ill-suited to cases involving some persons who crucially influence important 
public issues. Consider in particular the anonymous,157 power-behind-the-throne 
influencer who may be decisive in resolving a vital public issue but who remains 
behind the scenes and avoids the limelight.158 Such a person may vitally but 
unofficially affect a matter of public interest and concern without at all thrusting 
him- or herself into the vortex of public controversy.159 If libeled, such a person 
would not fit the established criteria for either general or limited public figure 
status.160 Once again, the public versus private figure libel plaintiff distinction 
is, at best, irrelevant and typically misleading. 
IV. DEVELOPING THE ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: HOW TO BEST 
UTILIZE THE CLEARLY CRUCIAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN LIBEL 
THAT DOES OR DOES NOT ADDRESS MATTERS OF PUBLIC 
INTEREST AND CONCERN 
The sheer irrelevance, distraction, and unavoidable unworkabilities of any 
distinctions among the various sorts of public and private figure libel plaintiffs 
seem clear. In general, the public and private figure libel plaintiff cases 
unfortunately have broken loose from the underlying logic of freedom of speech, 
if not also from the underlying logic of legitimate privacy concerns. Originally, 
the imposition of free speech limits on the state tort law of libel in the New York 
Times case “was firmly rooted in the desire to promote discussion about matters 
related to self-government.”161 Unfortunately, “as time passed, the Court and 
lower courts drifted farther and farther from that objective.”162 
Focusing instead on whether the allegedly libelous speech addresses a matter 
of public interest and concern would allow the constitutional law of libel to 
 
 156.  Consider whether an objectively reckless false accusation of drunken behavior in a 
restaurant serves the democratic and other free speech values at stake in the New York Times case. 
See supra notes 19–20; ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE NO LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 197 (1991) (discussing the Burnett case); see also Elena Kagan, A Libel Story: 
Sullivan Then and Now, 18 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 197, 199, 205–07, 211–12 (1993) (reviewing 
LEWIS, supra) (describing the scope of libel law as now extending well beyond the core free speech 
purposes). A similar logic should apply even to more serious accusations of criminal or civil 
misconduct and to other ethically objectionable behavior, except insofar as such accusations 
address matters of public interest and concern. 
 157.  See William M. Krogh, Comment, The Anonymous Public Figure: Influence Without 
Notoriety and the Defamation Plaintiff, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 839, 839–40 (2008). 
 158.  See id. 
 159.  See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 160.  See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342–46 (1974). 
 161.  David A. Anderson, Second Thoughts: A Response to David A. Logan’s Rescuing Our 
Democracy by Rethinking New York Times v. Sullivan, 82 OHIO ST. L.J. ONLINE 23, 26 (2021) 
(citing David A. Logan, Rescuing Our Democracy by Rethinking New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
81 OHIO ST. L.J. 759, 775 (2020)). 
 162.  Id. 
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attend, crucially, to the underlying reasons for specially protecting speech in the 
first place. Such a shift in focus would require the courts to pay less attention to 
the status, or to some sort of legal classification, of the libel plaintiff. While the 
crucial focus would thus no longer be on how to characterize the libel plaintiff, 
the focus would not then shift to the status of the libel defendant. Instead, the 
central inquiry would rightly be into the subject matter of the allegedly 
defamatory speech. 
It has been suggested that any such inquiry into the subject matter of the 
speech would involve uncertainties and impracticalities,163 or an increased 
danger to speech and debate on matters relevant to democratic self-
government.164 These and related critiques certainly deserve attention, which is 
provided in some measure below. 
The Court’s own modest guidance in this regard is largely summarized in the 
military funeral outdoor protest case of Snyder v. Phelps.165 Snyder’s account 
begins with the declaration that “[s]peech deals with matters of public concern 
when it can ‘be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or 
other concern to the community.’”166 This formulation, while unfortunately 
including the term concern in the very definition of public concern, usefully 
suggests an understanding of public concern that clearly exceeds the scope of 
the political or of governmental affairs. 
Perhaps to elaborate or provide a closely related but alternative understanding 
of public concern, the Court in Snyder then referred to “a subject of legitimate 
news interest; that is, a subject of general interest and of value and concern to 
the public.”167 This formulation, too, unhappily imports the very terms to be 
defined into the definition, but this formulation more importantly highlights the 
possibility of both subjective and objective “interest” in a given matter. 
One can be subjectively interested in a matter which is objectively trivial, or 
even in what one recognizes and concedes to be trivial. However, it is also 
possible to fail to take an interest, subjectively, in a matter of objectively great 
importance. A person may concede their lack of subjective interest in an 
objectively important matter. Worse though, one might fail to take an interest in 
an objectively important matter because, to take the extreme case, one has been 
propagandized or brainwashed in that regard. 
 
 163.  See James C. Mitchell, Rosenbloom’s Ghost: How a Discredited Decision Lives on in 
Libel Law, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 427, 427 (2004). 
 164.  See Stephen J. Mattingly, Note, Drawing a Dangerous Line: Why the Public-Concern 
Test in the Constitutional Law of Defamation Is Harmful to the First Amendment, and What Courts 
Should Do About It, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 739, 739–41 (2009). The specific argument by 
Mattingly is that any reliance on the public concern test, in any context, “threatens the First 
Amendment’s . . . central aim of protecting speech on issues relevant to self-government.” Id. at 
741. There is in particular such a fear “if the government itself were frequently allowed to decide 
what speech is relevant to self-government.” Id. at 739. Of course, any such determinations would 
typically be made by more or less independent judges rather than by legislators or executive 
officials. See id. In any event, and more substantively, it is difficult in the extreme for critics to 
condemn speech as both wrong in its politics and as also not political. 
 165.  562 U.S. 443 (2011). The paradox is typically glaring. 
 166.  Id. at 453 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983)). 
 167.  Id. (quoting City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004)). 
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The Snyder opinion then usefully observes that the “inappropriate or 
controversial character of a statement is irrelevant to . . . whether it deals with a 
matter of public concern.”168 Also, even the clear falsity of a claim does not 
affect whether it addresses a subject of public interest and concern. Whatever 
the free speech value of a false statement,169 its falsity does not literally change 
the nature of its subject. 
The Snyder Court’s elaboration then reiterated the need for a broad 
examination of the “content, form, and context”170 of the speech at issue. This 
examination should involve taking distinctive account of the broad value of 
freedom of expression.171 And finally, when considering the speech’s “content, 
form, and context, no factor is dispositive, and it is necessary to evaluate all the 
circumstances of the speech, including what was said, where it was said, and 
how it was said.”172 
Overall, this official guidance leaves many questions unresolved, if not 
entirely unaddressed. Let us, then, consider how to elaborate on the start the 
Court has made in addressing the most significant remaining issues. 
First, a focus on the subject matter addressed by an instance of speech is 
already a dramatic upgrade over any approach that requires any official 
assessment, even by independent courts, of the constitutional value of the 
instance of speech on its own substantive merits. Particularly in a culture of 
mutual distrust, alienation, political self-indulgence, and polarization,173 it is not 
difficult to downgrade the value of speech with which one disagrees on the 
merits. Such downgrading may be done subconsciously or without any 
conscious awareness of bias.174 
Far less credible and far less easily rationalized, though, is any claim that 
disfavored speech on some public matter is actually not speech that addresses 
any public matter. Simply put, one can hardly condemn bad political speech, in 
any sense, only to then claim, paradoxically, that it is actually not bad political 
speech because it does not address any public issue. Bad political speech 
inescapably addresses some aspect of politics, but in some way that is then found 
to be objectionable on the merits. By analogy, institutional theologians can 
hardly condemn a theological heresy without inescapably judging the heresy to 
 
 168.  Id. (quoting Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 387 (1987) (public employee speech 
discipline case)). 
 169.  See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 76–77 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., 1974) (1859); 
see also R. George Wright, “What Is That Honor?”: Re-Thinking Free Speech in the “Stolen 
Valor” Case, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 847, 850 (2013) (discussing the Court’s ambivalence as to the 
constitutional value of not merely false, but deliberately lying, speech). 
 170.  Snyder, 562 U.S. at 453 (citation and internal quotations omitted). 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Id. at 454; see also Clay Calvert, Public Concern and Outrageous Speech: Testing the 
Inconstant Boundaries of IIED and the First Amendment Three Years After Snyder v. Phelps, 17 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 437, 442, 446 (2014); Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Not a Free Press Court?, 2012 
BYU L. REV. 1819, 1825–26; Mark Strasser, What’s It to You: The First Amendment and Matters 
of Public Concern, 77 MO. L. REV. 1083, 1083 (2012) (“The Court must do more than merely say, 
‘It depends[]’ . . . .”). 
 173.  See, e.g., KEVIN VALLIER, TRUST IN A POLARIZED AGE 1–4 (2021). 
 174.  See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, Ideology, Motivated Reasoning, and Cognitive Reflection, 8 
JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 407, 407–08 (2013). 
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be theological or on some matter of theology, however objectional on its 
merits.175 It is technically possible to claim that one’s political opponent is not, 
in any sense, talking about politics, but any such paradoxical move would be 
transparently strategic.176 
Doubtless any legal distinction is subject, by one degree or another, to 
manipulation.177 Whether the speech of one’s political, social, or cultural 
antagonist is “important,” “legitimate,” “reasonable,” or “dangerous” is, in our 
culture, open to irresolvable debate. Nonetheless, the category of speech that 
addresses, however briefly, inarticulately, incompetently, or irresponsibly, any 
matter of public interest and concern178 is exceptionally resistant to political self-
serving manipulation.179 
Some real-world cases, however, involve defamatory speech that contains 
some elements of speech that do, and others that do not, address some matter of 
public interest. In some of those cases, it may be reasonably practical to separate 
out the elements of the speech that do, and that do not, address any matter of 
public interest. Thus separated, the courts would then apply the relevant aspects 
of the substantive law of libel to each element. 
More interesting would be a case in which the defamatory speech in some 
inseparable respects both does and in other respects does not address a matter of 
public concern. The speech in this kind of case cannot be disaggregated or 
disentangled into the two separate categories. Doubtless these would be 
relatively rare cases. In such cases, the courts can usefully look, by analogy, to 
the way courts have addressed cases in which commercial speech is inseparably 
intertwined with noncommercial, or broadly political, speech.180 
Thus, in cases in which the government seeks to regulate commercial speech 
 
 175.  See, e.g., Heresy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). 
 176.  Imagine the mental gymnastics required to conclude, e.g., that some fascist screed or THE 
COMMUNIST MANIFESTO does not address any matter of public interest and concern. See generally 
Kahan, supra note 174. 
 177.  Consider the idea of a governmental interest that is deemed “compelling” or a regulation 
that either is or is not “narrowly tailored” to its purpose. See, e.g., R. George Wright, The Fourteen 
Faces of Narrowness: How Courts Legitimize What They Do, 31 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 167, 169–70, 
194–95 (1997). 
 178.  Presumably, the dangerous political speech of one’s opponents should, because of that 
presumed danger, be of especially intense public concern. 
 179.  As well, speech that addresses matters of public interest and concern need not do so at 
any great length or with any further degree of articulateness. Speech on matters of public interest 
may thus be brief and not especially articulate. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16 (1971) 
(anti-draft jacket display). In general, articulateness and clarity are not required of protected speech. 
See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Bos., 515 U.S. 557, 569 (1995) 
(discussing protection of even vaguely expressed ideas of various sorts). And whether this 
minimum standard is, in its turn, sufficiently met is a question that can inevitably be asked in the 
context of any legal claim, including that of public figure status. Every legal concept involves 
questions of its minimally sufficient presence in some cases. Every concept must have some 
threshold of applicability. 
 180.  See, e.g., Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 677–79 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (per 
curiam); Bd. of Trs. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 473–75 (1989); Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., 
Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988); Dex Media W., Inc. v. City of Seattle, 696 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 
2012); Commc’ns Workers of Am. v. Ector Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 467 F.3d 427, 437–38 (5th Cir. 
2006); Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 260 (Cal. 2002), cert. granted, 534 U.S. 654 (2003), cert. 
dismissed as improvidently granted, 539 U.S. 654 (2003). 
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that is inextricably intertwined with political speech, the courts extend the 
highest level of free speech protection to the inseparably combined commercial 
and political speech.181 In Riley, the Court declared that “we cannot parcel out 
the speech, applying one test to one phrase and another test to another phrase. 
Such an endeavor would be both artificial and impractical. Therefore, we apply 
our test for fully protected expression.”182 
Analogous reasoning would suggest that where an item of defamatory speech 
addresses matters of public interest while also failing to do so in other 
inseparable respects, the speech as an inseparable whole should be treated as 
addressing a matter of public interest. And this seems to be the most reasonable 
approach, but it includes several stipulations, all with more general implications. 
Importantly, the overall distinction between speech that addresses and speech 
that does not address a matter of public interest does not itself dictate the precise 
constitutional test or level of scrutiny that should apply to either category. The 
distinction is, of course, clearly intended to provide substantially stronger 
constitutional protection for speech on matters of public interest. However, the 
distinction itself does not dictate, precisely, the New York Times test, a general 
strict scrutiny standard, or an objective recklessness standard for libel addressing 
matters of public interest. 
Nor does the distinction as to matters of public versus private interest itself 
dictate that regulations of libel not addressing a matter of public interest should 
still be bound by, say, the Dun & Bradstreet plurality test,183 by mid-level or 
minimum scrutiny, or by no federal constitutional protection at all beyond the 
constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection. 
Thus, the distinction between speech addressing and not addressing matters 
of public interest in itself leaves open, within sensible limits, a number of other 
jurisprudential issues, and this is as it should be. The most crucial problem with 
attempts to distinguish between public and private figure libel plaintiffs is not 
that they did not implicate, in some fashion, interesting questions of libel law. 
Rather, the basic problem with the distinction between public and private 
figures, even where reliably drawable, is that it points the law in the wrong 
direction. The basic reasons for protecting freedom of speech on broad public 
matters simply do not track the plaintiff’s public or private figure status.184 
Still, it would be helpful to develop some further sense of how to classify 
speech as either addressing or not addressing a matter of public interest and 
concern. Many cases, and certainly most of the inherently important cases, will 
involve speech that clearly addresses a matter of public interest. Other cases will 
clearly fall short of addressing any such matter. Where further guidance would 
be most useful is, as common sense would suggest, in the middle-ground or 
borderline cases. 
One option would be to decide the inevitable middle-ground or close cases on 
 
 181.  See Riley, 487 U.S. at 796. 
 182.  Id. 
 183.  See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759–61 (1985); 
see also supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 184.  See supra Part II. 
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more or less strategic but also principled grounds.185 In the middle-ground cases, 
the courts should be permitted to promote basic free speech purposes and values, 
without violating any clear privacy rights. In particular, courts should be 
permitted in this range of close cases to reasonably incentivize speakers to shift 
their focus, where entirely feasible and appropriate, in the direction of more 
clearly public-interest-related speech, thus converting a borderline case into an 
easier one. 
On this approach, potential speakers would be judicially encouraged to 
consider whether they could—at low cost, in practical terms, and with respect to 
their own free speech values and priorities—formulate their allegedly 
defamatory speech in some way that more clearly implicates a matter of public 
interest. The speaker’s point would not be distorted or suppressed but perhaps 
appropriately expanded in its scope and implications.186 
Thus, for example, consider the case of defamatory speech that would fall into 
some murky middle-ground as neither clearly within nor clearly short of a matter 
of public interest. The potential speaker in such a case would be legally 
incentivized to consider whether some broader social or political policy 
implication follows naturally and undistortedly from the personalized elements 
of the speaker’s grievance. 
Perhaps the speaker’s objection to the eventual libel plaintiff’s conduct 
actually implicates, say, broad nondiscrimination norms. Perhaps the speaker 
believes not merely that the eventual libel plaintiff’s behavior toward the speaker 
has been objectionable but that such behavior reflects a relevant broader pattern 
or practice187 or an institutional culture of which the eventual libel plaintiff is 
merely a small part. If so and if the speaker wishes to make that clearly related, 
broader, and more socially significant point along with or in support of a more 
personalized grievance, the speaker should, in the middle-range of cases, be 
reasonably encouraged to do so.188 
Finally, it is certainly true that speech, whether defamatory or not, can address 
matters of public interest and concern and yet be partly or entirely false and 
perhaps deliberately so. The distinction between speech that is or is not on a 
matter of public interest does not itself attempt to distinguish between true and 
false speech. But, of course, neither do any of the attempts to distinguish 
 
 185.  See generally R. George Wright, Speech on Matters of Public Interest and Concern, 37 
DEPAUL L. REV. 27, 30–31 (1987) (providing background information and further discussion in 
various contexts). 
 186.  Where otherwise appropriate, this incentivized broadening of the focus of one’s speech, 
for the middle-ground cases, might also tend to increase the audience for the speech in question. 
See id. at 31. 
 187.  As suggested in the racial discrimination in employment context by McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green. 411 U.S. 792, 804–05 (1973). See also the idea of a “pattern or practice” of 
discrimination referred to in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6. 
 188.  For an example from another context, a speaker may wish solely to accuse a celebrity of 
raping that speaker, but the speaker as in many “Me Too” cases may also wish to make a clearly 
related, broader social point. Consider cases such as McKee v. Cosby, 139 S. Ct. 675 (2019) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari). The lower courts in McKee unfortunately focused 
on the distraction, at best, of whether the speaker McKee should be considered a limited-purpose 
public figure, apart from the nature of her speech. See id. at 675–76. 
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between public figure and private figure libel plaintiffs. Any broader approach 
to libel law must, at some point, somehow address issues of falsity. The 
constitutional value, if any, of false statements, and of deliberately false 
statements in particular, is in any event currently contested.189 
V. CONCLUSION 
The constitutional law of libel has unfortunately focused crucially on 
distracting and misguided inquiries into the various distinctions among public 
figure and private figure libel plaintiffs. Equally unfortunate, attempts to reform 
and reconfigure the constitutional law of libel have often focused on public 
versus private figure libel plaintiff distinctions. The logic of free speech law 
itself suggests, instead, a judicial abandonment of this misconceived category. 
Attention instead to the distinction between defamatory speech that addresses 
and that does not address a matter of public interest and concern, however 
reasonably defined, actually tracks the basic reasons for protecting, and for 
limiting, freedom of speech in the first place. And this is where the constitutional 
law of libel should primarily focus. 
 
 
 189.  See generally Wright, “What Is That Honor?”: Re-Thinking Free Speech in the “Stolen 
Valor” Case, supra note 169. The classic defense of the social value of at least some forms of false 
or mistaken claims on public issues is that of JOHN STUART MILL, supra note 169, at 76–77, 80. 
But in an increasingly fragmented culture, the very ideas of truth and falsity can be subject to 
critique, subjectivization, and deconstruction. See, e.g., LEE MCINTYRE, POST-TRUTH 6, 9–10 
(2018). At least on Mill’s classical terms, there remains a sense that some false claims can revitalize 
public debate and challenge dogmatically held beliefs in uniquely valuable ways. Perhaps even a 
deliberate lie can reveal, uniquely, something of genuine political value about the speaker. 
Certainly, some merely negligent falsity in political claims must be tolerated. In any event, we need 
take no stand here on the precise legal test to be applied to false speech on a public issue. But it is 
certainly difficult to see much constitutionally relevant value in false and defamatory claims that 
do not address any matter of public interest. 
  
